The African dimension to the anti-federation struggle, ca. 1950-53: "it has united us far more closely than any other question would have accomplished" by Power, Rob
‘It has united us far more closely than any other 
question would have accomplished’.1 The African 
Dimension to the Anti-Federation Struggle, c.1950-53 
 
 
The documentary record of African opposition to the C[entral] A[frican] 
F[ederation] has been the subject renewed historiographical interest in recent 
years.2 This paper seeks to contribute to the existing debate in three principle ways. 
Firstly, it will be shown that opposition to the scheme was fatally undermined by the 
pursuit of two very distinct strands of N[yasaland] A[frican] C[ongress] and 
A[frican] N[ational] C[ongress] political activism. This dissimilar political 
discourse produced contradictions that resulted in the bypassing African objections. 
In the third instance, the paper will go a step further, suggesting that the two 
respective anti-Federation campaigns not only undermined Congress efforts to stop 
federation, but laid the path for future discord in the national dispensation then 
materialising.  
 
In 1988, John Darwin wrote that ‘with its telescope clapped firmly to its ear, London declared 
that [African] opposition [to Federation] could be neither seen nor heard’.3 The well-worn 
historiographical path points to the fact that African opposition was effectively ignored on the 
basis that ‘partnership’ between white settlers and black Africans in Northern and Southern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland offered a strong rationale for the CAF. The requisite benefits arising 
would see the promotion of African economic opportunities, the placation of settler politicians 
seeking to reduce the influence of the Colonial Office and the preservation of British influence 
in the region.4 The utility of ‘partnership’ was in its ambiguity. While Southern Rhodesia’s 
Prime Minister Godfrey Huggins foresaw the relationship akin to a ‘horse and its rider’, British 
officials, including the progressive Assistant Undersecretary for African Affairs Andrew 
Cohen, regarded the initiative as integral to preventing the spread of radical Afrikaner 
nationalism in Central Africa.5  
Darwin’s assertion that even with unified and coherent African opposition the course 
of events in Central Africa would likely have remained unaltered was likely accurate. But the 
ramifications of such a claim have been long-lasting. A thorough scrutiny of African opposition 
to the scheme is absent from debates concerning the origins of the Central African Federation. 
As a consequence, the extent to which a (mis)understanding of African political development 
influenced decisions to press ahead with such an ambitious state-building exercise fails to be 
appreciated. The focus on the experiences of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and not 
Southern Rhodesia, is deliberate. The federation’s northern territories were administered by the 
Colonial Office and both followed similar political trajectories after 1953. In contrast, Southern 
Rhodesia fell under the remit of the Commonwealth Relations Office. This effectively handed 
control over native affairs to the settler administration. By the early 1950s, one contemporary 
observer noted that Southern Rhodesia’s attitude to its African majority increasingly resembled 
a diluted version of South Africa’s apartheid policy.6 This was a strong opinion, but it 
nevertheless highlights the obvious discrepancy in the ways in which African rights and, more 
pertinently, African advancement in the Rhodesias was perceived.  
The intention of this article is to shed light on the complex dynamics of African political 
mobilisation in the early 1950s in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The challenge facing 
African politicians in the late 1940s was twofold: how could effective, and ‘reasonable’, 
opposition to the CAF be presented to the British government and, closely related, how could 
support be generated among grass roots to give reasonable weight to NAC and ANC objections. 
These two divergent objectives would require dissimilar programmes and agendas. Political 
activists were broadly successful in drawing together local grievances and presenting a 
‘national’ campaign against federation. Their actions provided a stimulus to popular, 
nationalist, agitation and pointed to a rejection of the status quo. Inherent within this moment 
of mass political engagement, however, was tension and uncertainty. NAC and ANC leaders 
could only do so much to present a truly ‘national’ campaign. Efforts to build Congress prestige 
at grass roots was rooted in the exploitation of ‘local’ grievances. As the anti-federation 
campaign was scaled up, it became increasingly difficult for Congress leaders to act in the 
‘national’ interest without alienating local or sectional concerns of their regional support base. 
The evolution of two very distinct internal and external strands of African political agitation 
therefore served to undermine the overall credibility of the anti-federation campaign. By 1953, 
colonial authorities could publicly dismiss African opposition to the scheme on the basis that 
‘partnership’ would encourage ‘sensible’ political development.  
 
Translating the Anti-federation Message: Grass-Roots Mobilisation 
The concept of creating an enlarged Central African state dated back to 1915 when the British 
South Africa Company, then administering Northern and Southern Rhodesia under Royal 
Charter, proposed an amalgamation of the territories in order to promote greater economic 
coordination.7 The issue rose to prominence in 1936, pushing the British Conservative 
government to appoint a commission under the chairmanship of Lord Bledisloe to explore 
feasible options for ‘some form of cooperation between the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. 
Published in 1939, the report ruled against amalgamation of the Central African territories, but 
left the door ajar for settler politicians, under the forceful leadership Roy Welensky and 
Godfrey Huggins, to push for further concessions. A deadlock remained until 1951, when 
Labour’s new Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker embarked on a fact-
finding mission in Central Africa. In March 1952, he produced a hugely influential 
memorandum which established the foundations for a Central African Federation. Although 
federation fell short of the settler desire for amalgamation between the Rhodesias, it was seen 
by British officials as a useful compromise. After protracted discussions with settler politicians 
including Welensky and Huggins, officials in the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth 
Relations Office drew up a draft federal scheme at the Lancaster House Conference in April 
1952.  
The prospect of closer association elicited opposition from the African political 
community from the outset.8 Through welfare societies and native associations, African 
intellectuals sought in every conceivable way to better their position using constitutional 
means. They operated like pressure groups on behalf of their members, attempting to exert 
influence upon government on an impressive range of subjects.9 But whilst the prospect of 
closer association remained unclear, there little incentive was provided for concerted political 
organisation. The problem stemmed partly from the narrow elitism which characterised African 
political representation at this time. As Harold Kittermaster, the Governor of Nyasaland 
remarked in 1939, native associations were far from being representative of African opinion in 
general and far less valuable than the cohort of tribal leaders upon whom his government relied 
to deal with native matters. He personally preferred ‘to pour cold water on the associations 
rather than try to regulate or suppress them’.10  
As discussions over the prospect of a federation in Central Africa gathered pace, so too 
did African political agitation. The challenge facing activists was to broaden their support base. 
The formation of the Nyasaland African Congress in 1944, and the formation of the Northern 
Rhodesian African National Congress four years later, heralded a significant moment in this 
regard. As Dauti Yamba, the NRAC’s first Deputy President stated, the formation of the party 
was an attempt foster unity among the people, breaking ‘tribal barriers’ and cultivate a national 
agenda.11 There were inevitable tensions within the movement, but colonial authorities still 
viewed these developments with a degree of anxiety. As early as 1947, the Secretary for Native 
Affairs warned in a confidential circular to Provincial Commissioners that Africans were 
‘entering a difficult phase of race consciousness’ and that ‘every opportunity must be taken to 
retain its confidence and guide it into safe channels’.12 
African opposition to federation was born of long experience of restricted opportunities 
to participate equally in economic and political life in Central Africa. Within this context the 
safeguards offered in the Federal Scheme by the British—including preservation of Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland’s ‘protectorate status’ and the provision that responsibility for matters 
directly affecting Africans affairs would be safeguarded by the African Affairs Board—were 
entirely meaningless. For many, the federation represented permanent subjection to white 
settlers in Central Africa.13 Harry Nkumbula, who was to be elected to the presidency of the 
NRAC in July 1951, fully appreciated the constitutional impact of federal proposals on African 
advancement. This was borne from his experience as a student in London during the later 
1940s, during which time he had actively engaged with anticolonial and radical circles. He 
regularly attended meetings of the West African Students’ Union, listening to his ‘elders’ – 
Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, and staunch Pan-Africanist George Padmore – and 
had frequent contact with senior anti-colonial campaigners including Rita Hinden, secretary of 
the Fabian Colonial Bureau, Harold Laski, the chairman of the Labour Party and Fenner 
Brockway. As Macola suggests, it was as much the exposure to a climate of racial tolerance in 
London as it was the ideologies of Nkumbula’s peers which influenced his views on 
federation.14 Most influential in this regard was Hastings Banda, the future leader of the 
Nyasaland Congress, then practicing medicine in North London. It was with Banda that 
Nkumbula published, ‘Federation in Central Africa’, the first major African intervention in the 
anti-federation debate. Claiming to speak on behalf of Africans in Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, the pamphlet railed against the indignities suffered by fellow Africans in Southern 
Rhodesia and warned that federation would result in the extension of such policies 
northwards.15 The extent to which this influential treatise came to shape the outward-looking 
anti-federation campaign will be examined later, but it was clear that a precedent had been 
established. Federation was the first step in the permanent subjugation to white settlers in 
Central Africa; the scheme itself a crude attempt by white minorities to obtain absolute 
authority over the direction of native policy.16 Similar arguments were expressed by the 
Nyasaland African Congress in a pamphlet entitled, ‘Why We Oppose Federation: Our Aims 
and Objectives’.17 
The principle problem facing Congress leaders in the early 1950s was that so few 
subscribed to their political agenda. Few understood the perceived impact that federation would 
have on future African political, social, and economic development. The immediate objective 
of NRAC and NAC leaders therefore was to expand and scale-up political agitation to make 
arguments against the federation relevant at grass roots. The first stage in this process was to 
transform the Congresses into genuine political parties. In 1951, Nkumbula embarked upon an 
extensive organisational drive, touring Northern Rhodesia’s provinces emphasising to local 
Congress organisers the need to maintain registers of paid-up members and donations. Early in 
1952, the first permanent NRAC party headquarters was established in Chilenje, Lusaka, and 
efforts were made to streamline the financial running of the party by publishing an official 
schedule of membership and yearly subscription fees.18 Following a nationwide tour in May 
1952, Nkumbula was able to claim a total membership amounting to some 20,000 people in 
some 75 branches.19 These estimates may have been optimistic, but the rise in the number of 
Congress subscribers helped facilitate the employment of a number of salaried provincial 
organising secretaries who were tasked with the business of registering new members and 
spreading the Congress message.20 As Godwin Lewanika wrote to the secretary of the Fabian 
Colonial Bureau in June 1952, the newly named African National Congress of Northern 
Rhodesia [ANC] could claim to represent the interests of all Africans in the territory.21  
For political leaders, the anti-federation was a catch-all issue which had the potential to 
cut across urban-rural and ethno-regional divides. The key was thus to create a populist political 
agenda, one that made coterminous the issue of federation with shared anxieties and local 
grievances. One of the most important tactics in this regard was to tap into historical fears 
pertaining to land alienation.22 In April 1953, for example, Harry Nkumbula delivered a speech 
in the Copperbelt provinces stating that ‘the Europeans of this country have plans for taking 
you away from the villages where you carry out independent life’. With his rural Southern 
Province roots, Nkumbula might have been speaking to his own constituents. But implicit in 
his claim was an effort to show that both rural and urban regions were affected by the same 
issue.23 When he asked rhetorically whether Welensky would remove Africans from their land 
once federation had been established, he was doing so because the matter struck at the very 
heart of deeply held African fears.24 The Congress-led struggle against federation was thus 
imbued with a moral currency. He went on to state that ‘the policy [of fighting federation] is a 
long-drawn one and difficult’. ‘I would ask the public that if they are not prepared to suffer 
from dismissals, imprisonment, and other kind of torture in the fight for national independence 
which is at the core of their hearts, they must say so now’.25 To devote oneself to Congress 
therefore was akin to sacrificing oneself for their people.  
Between 1951-53, provincial reports circulated in both territories noting with alarm the 
extent to which African agitators had been successful in making coterminous the issue of land 
alienation with federation. In Northern Rhodesia, J.E. Passmore, District Commissioner in 
Southern Province, remarked that the fear of loss of land was ready-made for Congress 
agitators to work on. ‘The general attitude of Africans is one of intense suspicion that the 
Europeans are plotting to take away their land’, he said. ‘Every political move or development 
proposal is viewed in this light’.26 American anthropologist Hortense Powdermaker, then 
conducting research in the Copperbelt, buttressed his claims. Most people she spoke with, ‘with 
or without education, young and old’, had ‘a compulsive need to talk about [federation] and 
the related fear of losing their land’.27  
In Nyasaland, meanwhile, Governor Geoffrey Colby reported with concern in March 
1952 that African opposition was ‘hardening as realisation of what is at stake spreads to the 
non-vocal masses’.28 A month later, 3,000 Africans crammed into the market square in 
Blantyre to attend an emergency conference of the Nyasaland Congress. There they listened to 
a speech given by the Reverend Michael Scott, Director of the African Bureau, summarising a 
letter written by Hastings Banda. In it, Banda railed against federation and the dangers it 
presented to the ‘African way’ of life. It ought thus to be met with ‘the strongest non-violent 
resistance’.29 By August, the Nyasaland Special Branch noted that everywhere the NAC had 
begun to turn African opinion decisively against federation. When the preliminary White Paper 
detailing federal proposals was published, Africans ‘had been willing to discuss the paper with 
every sign of interest’. The mood of Africans had changed, however, to ‘one of obstinate refusal 
to discuss anything connected with it at any level’.30  
Efforts to play up the historical legacy of settler domination created an atmosphere in 
which fear and suspicion thrived. This found expression in the growth of several rumours which 
came to exercise a profound impact on the people’s understanding of federation and all that it 
entailed. Early in 1952, for instance, two government employees, David Simfukwe and 
Michael Sakala, produced a pamphlet circulating a rumour that the British and Northern 
Rhodesian authorities had embarked upon a campaign to sell poisoned sugar to Africans.31 On 
the Copperbelt, the sale of sugar dropped suddenly. From sugar, the rumour turned to tinned 
‘human’ meat, which was being sold to Africans to poison them and break their opposition to 
federation. The rumour was so strong in Lusaka that children were kept away from school and 
people became afraid to walk the streets at night.32 To further the anti-federation cause, the 
ANC made several attempts to legitimise African suspicions. In December 1952, Congress 
leaders substantiated the banyama (vampire-men) rumour by accusing the government of 
complicity in the attacks on innocent Africans for ‘failing to deal with the Vampire men 
threatening the peace and order of the country’.33 Whilst Congress activists did not create the 
rumours – the banyama myth, for instance, stretched back to the 1930s – they were a means by 
which the anti-federation message could be translated into a usable lexicon of protest.34 
Rumours soon spread to Nyasaland and parts of Southern Rhodesia, extending to the belief that 
African members of the pro-federation, white-led Capricorn Africa Society, founded in 1949 
to campaign for closer association, were kidnapping Africans and selling them to Europeans. 
The fact that they spread so rapidly at this time, Luise White suggests, reflected the deep 
concerns of the people hearing the story. People expressed themselves in ways which unduly 
emphasised the supernatural, but their fears were genuine.35  
The emphasis on a shared struggle formed part of a broader strategy to utilise and 
infiltrate tribal structures of power to bolster Congress prestige and popularity. Tribal elders 
were conduits of information in their respective native areas. They could at once facilitate the 
drawing together of local grievances with a national campaign and make easier the coordination 
of political activity and the dissemination of Congress campaign material in their areas of 
chiefly authority. Permission to establish party headquarters in their regions would also 
streamline the collection of funds for those willing to contribute financial to the anti-federation 
cause.36 Whilst both Congress parties had worked together informally with a number of chiefs, 
many remained broadly absent from the political debate over federation. It was partly for this 
reason that efforts were made in the early 1950s to better facilitate coordination of political 
activities with chiefs. In 1953, for instance, ANC leaders discussed the creation of Chiefs 
Provincial Councils to facilitate cooperation between chiefs and ANC activists in the localities. 
To encourage the involvement of chiefs in Congress-sponsored protest, activists went to great 
lengths to emphasise the likely impact that federation would have on chiefly power. If 
federation would dilute the influence of the colonial state, activists argued, then chiefly power 
would also diminish. Whilst some chiefs might have been perceived to be the agents of the 
colonial state, their inherent sensitivity towards losing office meant that they were a crucial 
component in the strategy to mobilise grass roots support. 
There was inevitably some discord and disagreement among chiefs, but ANC and NAC 
efforts to cultivate a network of collaboration among traditional rulers opened scope for a 
broader field of operations than had hitherto been possible. In Northern Rhodesia, chiefs in the 
Southern Province agreed in 1953 to raise sums for a legal case to be brought against the British 
government by Africans in Northern Rhodesia. Every Chief agreed to subscribe not less than 
£5, all village headmen no less than £2 and ordinary men of taxable age £1. Chief Macha from 
the Choma District remarked that the atmosphere was one of unity. ‘I wish to express how 
thankful I am to see that the spirit of God has united us all during our stay in this meeting…We 
must all learn to respect those who are placed to lead us be they small or big, rich or poor’.37 
Chief Munymbwe from Gwembe echoed such sentiments, calling for Congress officials to visit 
his area as his people were ‘dying in ignorance’.38 Similar networks developed between the 
NAC and a number of chiefs in Nyasaland. Initially urged by the Nyasaland government not 
to involve themselves with Congress politics, the fear that federation would mark the erosion 
of colonial authority increasingly drew chiefs into the NAC’s sphere of influence. Kinross 
Kulujiri, the secretary of the NAC’s Blantyre branch, felt confident enough to remark in late 
1951 that ‘all chiefs agree with us politically and socially’.39 In April 1952, NAC and several 
prominent chiefs joined forces on a visit to London. There, they met with British sympathisers, 
and later boycotted the Lancaster House conference on the grounds that they would not stand 
to countenance federation and a scheme which places the future of Africans in the hands of 
settler dominated federal government.  
The actions of the NAC-chief delegation mightn’t have caused a radical rethink in 
Britain’s position, but it did create sufficient concern at the highest political levels to provoke 
the Colonial Office into action. Following a meeting between the delegation and the Colonial 
Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, became convinced that the NAC-inspired anti-federation campaign 
was beginning to gain traction. To prevent widespread civil disobedience, colonial officials 
were instructed now to ‘sell’ the federal scheme. Given the extent of what was considered a 
worrying strain of opposition, Africans were to be told that they were simply not ready for self-
government. After all, Nyasaland’s wealth and development depended ‘entirely on the skill of 
Europeans’.40 Perceived as an overt statement of their relative insignificance to the nation’s 
development, chiefs, farmers and workers signed up en masse to participate in the NAC’s anti-
federation campaign. New radicals in NAC, notably Mikeka Mkandawire and Hartwell 
Soloman of the Blantyre branch, urged greater focus on grass roots protest. In April 1953, the 
Supreme Action Council, a joint council of Congress and chiefs led by Chief Mwase of 
Kasungu and NAC president J.R.N. Chinyama was formed.41 Tasked with the express aim of 
coordinating a campaign of non-cooperation – including boycotts, non-payment of taxes, and 
suspension of African participation in government – the Council’s job was made easier by a 
poor harvest in the Northern and Central Provinces and the scaling up of ANC activities in 
Northern Rhodesia.42  
Within weeks, Council meetings had taken place in the Northern, Central and Southern 
Provinces with eighty-three chiefs signing a petition against the imposition of federation and 
many issuing statements in support of the Supreme Council. Disquiet soon began to proliferate 
throughout the territory, and district reports indicated that councils and local courts were not 
meeting and that people had stopped paying tax and were disregarding agricultural rules and 
forestry regulations. Chief Mwase refused to attend the Queen’s coronation whilst Chief 
Gomani obstinately ordered his people to disregard all agricultural, forestry and veterinary laws 
and suggested that they refuse to pay taxes.43 This was not an insignificant series of events; the 
attitude of senior chiefs established a precedent that was to set the tone for anti-federation 
agitation, with ever more frequent reports that individuals in favour of federation were being 
subjected to terrorisation.44 The increase in political temperature eventuated in the eruption of 
a series of violent disturbances in the Southern Province. In August, over 5,000 Africans 
assembled at Cholo boma to protest about the imposition of higher rents for land. Once village 
headmen were arrested, the protesting crowd proceeded to riot.45 Unrest spread throughout the 
province; armed gangs roamed the countryside, road blocks were set up and labourers were 
encouraged to stop working. Only when police reinforcements were called in from Tanganyika, 
South Africa and Northern Rhodesia did protests stop. During the course of the unrest, 11 
people were killed and 50 wounded.46 Recalling the events, former civil servant and Congress 
member George Nyondo, then a young boy of 13, stated that he had been ‘shocked’ and 
saddened by the actions of the soldiers used to quell unrest in Blantyre. ‘They were very, very 
violent’, he said. ‘We felt afraid to come out of our home after we had heard what the 
government were doing to the people’.47 Occurring against the backdrop of the anti-federation 
campaign, it was initially assumed that the disturbances were of a political nature, and thus 
warranted harsh reprisal. After a thorough investigation into the event, however, a report 
concluded that the disturbances had been ostensibly ‘local’ in character and had in fact ‘nothing 
to do with Federation’.48 This was no mild affair; state suppression of the disturbances had 
been ‘skilful’ and ‘ruthless’, and left an indelible imprint on the minds of Africans in regards 
to what life in the CAF would entail.49   
Events in Northern Rhodesia followed a similar trajectory. Soon after the publication 
of the Draft Federal Scheme in April, the terms of which had been agreed at the Lancaster 
House Conference, the ANC began drafting alternative plans for the constitutional 
development. Addressing a crowd of supporters in Lusaka, Nkumbula was unequivocal in his 
stance. Africans would not back down from their demands. ‘The best government for the black 
people is a government fully manned and run by the black people of Africa’, he said. ‘I do not 
accept white man’s Governments. They to me are foreign and foreign they will remain’.50 The 
racial terms used by Nkumbula at this time again hint at efforts to cultivate a spirit of 
togetherness among all Africans in Northern Rhodesia. During the last stages of debate in 
British Parliament, the ANC President symbolically burned the final Federal Scheme for 
Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland before an audience of 800 in Lusaka, 
threatening widespread unrest if Britain continued with its plans for federation. Efforts to clamp 
down on Congress activism were scaled up thereafter. In September, K.M. Chittenden, the 
District Commissioner for Namwala, Nkumbula’s home district, wrote to the Provincial 
Commissioner of the Southern Province suggesting ‘a little publicity carefully put around about 
his private life might be advantageous’.51 A month earlier, Nkumbula had complained to former 
Prime Minister Clement Attlee, who had been despatched to investigate that ANC supporters 
had been subjected to a sustained campaign of intimidation by ‘pro-federation authorities’. 
Chiefs had been stopped from attending meetings, he said, and African labourers were being 
removed from their jobs. He even complained that members of the Capricorn Africa Society 
had been ‘buying’ support for federation.52  
Many mightn’t have fully understood the political rationale for federation, but the 
success of ANC and NAC activists in mobilising opinion against it indicates an awareness of 
the racial inequalities likely to materialise under it. The continued exclusion of African voices 
from official discussions over federation did little to ameliorate African suspicions. White 
political domination would necessarily translate to permanent white economic domination, 
which would find expression in the seizure of land. As reported by Church of Scotland Mission 
Council following an investigation into African objections to federation, ‘African opposition 
is not to details of the scheme but to the whole principle’, which evoked strong comparisons 
with the treatment of native populations in South Africa.53  
 
The Outward-looking Anti-Federation Campaign, 1950-53 
Grass roots mobilisation was often carried out by ANC and NAC activists at the local level. 
Whilst they acted on guidance and principles established by party headquarters, they were able 
to translate much larger ideas into a language more easily understood by their constituents. The 
outward-looking anti-federation campaign was under the direct control of the leaders of the 
Congresses. Understandably, it was framed in very different terms to local mobilisation 
campaigns. ANC and NAC leaders adopted a rhetoric which steered away from negative 
associations and feared settler domination. Instead, emphasis was placed on Britain’s 
paternalistic responsibilities to its African subjects. A common feature in the hundreds of 
letters, statements and petitions written to colonial officials and sympathisers in Britain was 
the responsibility of the British government to heed the objections of its loyal colonial 
citizens.54 On 17th April, four delegates from Nyasaland – including Legislative Council 
members E.K. Mpose, E. Alexander Muwanba, NAC member Clement Kumbikano and 
Protectorate Council members Edward Gondwe – met with the Colonial Secretary. There, they 
registered their unequivocal opposition to federation on the basis that African rights were to be 
protected by the British, not by any other government.55 Framed within similar terms was a 
petition addressed to Queen Elizabeth by a visiting delegation of chiefs, commoners, and two 
Congress members in January 1953. The delegation was later to be joined by the NAC’s future 
president Hastings Banda, who was suspected by the Colonial Office of ‘stage managing the 
show’.56  
The petition was a powerful document, illustrative of the frustration and disappointment 
felt by the traditional authorities of Nyasaland.57 Aggrieved that their country had been 
included in federation merely to ‘counterbalance’ Rhodesia’s settler population, the petition 
emphasised promises made by Queen Victoria to uphold chiefly authority and protect the 
people of Nyasaland.58 Harry Nkumbula couched the ANC’s appeal in similar terms. In a 
revealing report of a meeting with colonial officials in July 1952, he wrote that the ‘loyalty of 
the Africans to the Queen of England cannot be doubted’. In stark contrast to his appeals for 
support against the ‘land grubbing’ colonialist, Africans strived to advance as ‘protected 
persons’ under British stewardship, not to find their ambitions and goals frustrated under white 
settler government.59 The campaign soon came to be couched in strong moral terms. In a 
statement intended to strike at the core of British values, Nkumbula argued: 
Britain is not only on the wrong side of legality in dealing with her colonial peoples 
but also her international race relations in general, and that of her colonial peoples 
in particular…To me, nothing could be more savage and immoral than the 
imposition of such a measure against the unwilling millions of inhabitants of 
Central Africa.60 
 
The initial focus of the ANC and the NAC, who worked closely with Nyasaland chiefs 
in the external appeal to British officials, was to provoke a change in the Conservative 
government’s policy towards Central Africa. Once it became clear that the Colonial Office 
would not be swayed, a discernible shift can be detected in approach. In language which hints 
at an intersection of the internal and external campaign strands, objections to the CAF became 
framed in the language of African advancement, not British stewardship of Africans. European-
led multiracialism was rejected entirely, instead, to be replaced with staged constitutional 
devolution that would place Africans at the very centre of territorial politics. The ANC in 1952, 
for instance, envisaged three stages to an expansion of the African franchise that would 
eventuate in demands for self-government.61 These calls for self-government became ever 
more forceful in early 1953. Attempts were even made at this time to legally challenge 
federation on the basis of historical claims to land ownership and promises made by the Crown 
to safeguard African welfare.62 Whilst the case was unlikely to succeed, it nevertheless points 
to a turning point in the relationship with Britain.  
The change in stance was reflected in attempts to extend the parameters in which the 
debate over federation was taking place. If the government would not negotiate, pressure would 
have to be exerted to force a change in hand. The British people must be shown that ‘time is 
overdue for the increased African participation in the running of their country’.63 Soon after 
deciding to boycott the Lancaster House conference in April 1952, NAC and ANC leaders used 
funds of over £7,000 collected from among their supporters to send a delegation to Britain to 
‘educate the British public in Central African Affairs’.64 As remarked by Reverend Michael 
Scott, this was ‘a tremendous sum for these people to get together’ and indicated the strength 
of feeling towards federation. ‘We have been entrusted by our people’, read the ANC’s press 
statement, ‘with the task of explaining to the British people what are the hopes and fears which 
we in Central African have today and why we felt it necessary to come here in order to appeal 
that the British Government reconsider its decision to establish Federation in Central Africa’.65  
The visit of both ANC and NAC members and chiefs had a significant impact on 
contemporary observers and anti-colonial campaign groups in Britain. ‘Make no mistake’, 
wrote Reverend Michael Scott, then Director of the hugely influential anti-colonial pressure 
group, the Africa Bureau, ‘Britain should not proceed on the false assumption that the 
opposition to Federation can safely be ignored as something quite unsubstantial and 
ineffectual’.66 Parliament became one of the key arenas for debate. In March 1952 the Labour 
Party passed a resolution condemning the ‘idea of federation’ unless the native populations 
gave their ‘full assent’.67 Innumerable petitions and letters were subsequently sent to 
government officials and prominent domestic newspapers, arguing in favour of greater 
consultation with African opinion. ‘What does ‘partnership’ mean’, enquired the FCB in a 
pamphlet published in May 1952. ‘Does it mean ‘partnership’ between separate racial 
communities, whatever their size and state of development? Does it mean ‘equal’ ‘partnership’, 
or ‘senior and junior’ ‘partnership’?68 Adding further pressure to the Conservative government 
was a petition sent by the NAC to the United Nations in May 1952 which asked for an impartial 
investigation to be carried out to assess whether the scheme was compatible with Article 73.69  
The outward looking campaign was certainly successful in drawing a much wider 
audience into the debate concerning federation. In drawing overt reference to the strong racial 
implications of the scheme, the attention of anti-Apartheid and anti-colonial activists in Britain 
was harnessed. In providing both small donations and the means to print and distribute political 
literature, they helped both Congresses to establish themselves as functioning political 
organisations. The advice received as to how the campaign might impact more favourably on 
British officials proved valuable, not least as a means to develop a degree of political maturity 
among Congress leaders that might only be gained with an insight into the decision-making 
process in the metropole. It was thanks to the guidance given by Michael Scott, for instance, 
that the Congress boycott of the Lancaster House conference must be accompanied by an effort 
to send able delegates to Britain to put forward a case against federation.70 These early 
exchanges were more perhaps important for what they represented rather than for their 
achievements. In the first instance, they certainly point to a degree of political maturity that 
had been denied them by colonial officials. The goal to ‘educate’ the British people showed 
not only an awareness that extra support was needed to sustain anti-federation activities, but 
perhaps, more importantly, an awareness of the broader anti-colonial context in which 
discussions over federation were taking place. The external campaign thus not only helped to 
legitimise objections to the federal scheme, but they also established both the NAC and ANC 
as the political representatives of African opinion in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Whilst 
more established political elites were not disenfranchised in the debate, it introduced a much 
stronger strain of anti-colonial activism that would become characteristic of nationalist 
agitation in the late 1950s. Although the outward-looking campaign might have failed in its 
goals to stop federation, it did therefore prove successful in ways that were to exercise a long-
lasting impact on the future of Central Africa.  
 
Political Agitation and Seeds of Disunity 
Despite an undeniable increase in political agitation plans for the Central African Federation 
proceeded unhindered. The final constitutional conference, held in London at Carlton House, 
even weakened the role of the African Affairs Board, a measure intended to safeguard African 
interests.71 Scepticism over the credibility of African opposition remained. Henry Hopkinson’s 
now infamous 1952 report, which claimed that between 90 and 95 per cent of Africans ‘knew 
nothing and cared little about federation’, was a common articulation of the official mind.72 
The perception that reasonable African opposition did not exist undoubtedly reflected 
commitment to a much broader colonial strategy, of which the Central African Federation was 
an important part.73 As this article has shown, opposition to federation did exist, and reactions 
of the colonial authorities to political agitation clearly reflected the extent to which it threatened 
to destabilise Colonial Office plans. But why African opposition was not regarded as 
sufficiently strong enough to decisively alter British plans must encourage a much closer 
scrutiny of the African anti-federation campaign.  
The extent to which NAC and ANC leaders were forced to address two rather disparate 
challenges – domestic grass roots mobilisation and the mounting of an ‘external’ opposition 
campaign – created tensions within each movement. The outward-looking campaign, for 
instance, gave emphasis to ‘African’ solidarity and Britain’s responsibilities to safeguarding 
African development. Such an appeal was based on collective togetherness which transcended 
the idea of ‘the nation’. This was then projected on an undeniably international stage. The 
internal mobilisation campaign, however, reflected the widely differing lived experiences 
under colonial rule. Whilst it brought chiefs and subjects, men and women, urban and rural 
together in opposition to federation, activists at grass roots continued to couch appeals for 
support in local, rather than national, terms. Much owed to the fact that coordination from ANC 
and NAC headquarters was often lacking, and local party activists were often given a freer 
hand in determining not only the ideological basis of their appeals, but also the scale of their 
activities. This was demonstrated in the cleavage between moderates and radicals that 
developed within the NAC following the Cholo disturbances. Whilst Chief Mwasa and 
President of the NAC J.R.N Chinyama toured Cholo appealing for calm, members of the 
Supreme Council including Mikeka Mkandawire and Hartwell Solomon followed in their wake 
urging people not to give up the struggle.74  
This lack of central control was exacerbated by strong regional loyalties expressed by 
political leaders. In claiming the economic future of the country depended upon ‘large scale 
agricultural development’, for example, Nkumbula was likely speaking directly from loyalty 
to his own, Southern Province, constituency.75 At the same time, sections of the ANC’s urban 
support base demonstrated a strong reluctance to commit to the party’s anti-federation agenda. 
In April 1953 the African Mine Workers Union [AMWU], led by Lawrence Katilungu, failed 
to participate in a ‘day of national prayer’ organised by Nkumbula despite having given their 
word to do so.76 As Miles Larmer suggests, trade union leaders had initially supported 
Congress, having been assigned 8 out of 11 seats on the Supreme Action Council. As the anti-
federation campaign wore on, however, AMWU leaders became increasingly concerned that 
the ANC campaign was running at odds with the colonial and company authorities upon whom 
union leaders depended for successful negotiations on pay and conditions.77 Hundreds of 
mineworkers did in fact take strike action during the days of action in 1953 but were dismissed 
as a result. Financial motivations were clearly at play here, but it is no coincidence that tension 
within the party found expression in an urban-rural or ethno-regional framework.  
The anti-federation campaign comprised two very distinct strands, each running 
concurrently but each utilising a dissimilar political discourse. With regional concerns at the 
core of both movements, there was little opportunity for national unity. This also accounts for 
the failure to launch a joint, pan-Central African, Congress which might in the event have 
proved far more effective in challenging federation. This was perhaps best illustrated by the 
non-attendance of the NAC at an emergency African inter-territorial conference arranged for 
March 1953 in Northern Rhodesia at which proposals were to be discussed to ‘explore possible 
means of cooperation in future’.78 The dissonance resonating between these two levels served 
ultimately to undermine the universalist framework in which Congress activists believed they 
were operating. Uneven political development of this nature was interpreted by colonial 
authorities as unpredictable and thus a potentially destabilising force. This is large part explains 
why some British officials adopted a somewhat patronising view of Africans in Central 
Africa.79 Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Lord Ismay, commented to the Governor of 
Southern Rhodesia in 1952 for example, that Central Africa was a very special case. If Britain 
was to fulfil its role as Governess properly, Africans in Central Africa had to be given ‘better 
prospects and better education before we can think of full political emancipation’.80  
 
Conclusion  
The purpose of this article has been to shed light on the respective mobilisation campaigns of 
the African National Congress of Northern Rhodesia and the Nyasaland African Congress. It 
has shown that the campaign against federation served to galvanise nationalist agitation, and 
provided somewhat of a political education for nationalist politicians in advocating African 
advancement at the highest political levels. An important part of mobilising against the scheme 
was to build a broad support base among grass roots. The tactics used by the ANC and NAC 
at this time primarily centred on the articulation of ‘local’ grievances, which were then given 
‘national’ relevance by linking them closely with settler domination and restriction of African 
socio-economic development. Intersecting with grass roots mobilisation, Congress activists 
voiced their opposition in the highest political circles, shining the spotlight on the issue of racial 
inequality in Central Africa. Whilst both internal and external campaigns fell short of stopping 
Federation, they were nevertheless successful in building the profile of both parties. The 
achievements of African politicians are greater when considered in the context of 
circumstances in which they were operating. In the initial instance, Africans were faced with 
the prospect of negotiating with a Conservative government considered to be far more 
sympathetic with the ambitions of settlers, at a time in which a perceived Afrikaner threat was 
at its zenith. In the second instance, both Congresses were beset with financial constraints, 
which curtailed the scope of their activities. Grass roots mobilisation thus assumed an enhanced 
significance, since individual donations to party branches would effectively finance the anti-
federation campaign. This stood in stark contrast to the pro-federation, settler dominated, 
United Federal Party, which could afford to lobby British government ministers via a public 
relations company.81 
Implicit within this success, however, was an undercurrent of tension which served to 
reinforce ‘official’ scepticism of African political capabilities. Such sentiment was widely 
shared in British official circles, and centred largely on the premise of African ‘inexperience’. 
As Clement Attlee told the ANC’s Executive Committee in August 1952, ‘you cannot learn 
politics from a textbook. It takes experience’.82 The CAF was not necessarily, therefore, a 
hastily conceived reaction to settler nationalism and South African expansionism.83 Rather, it 
was believed the CAF would provide ‘opportunities’ for a more ‘reasonable’, ‘moderate’, strain 
of African politics to take root.84 This was a risky strategy, but short-term alienation of the 
African community was deemed far more beneficial for long-term African interests than 
conceding to anti-federation opposition in the short term. Lyttelton remarked as such in his 
memoirs. ‘Since we were determined to federate Northern and Southern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland so as to promote the happiness and welfare of the inhabitants’, he said, ‘it was our 
duty to propound the policy … even against the opposition and maybe the violence of a vocal 
minority’.85  
In the event, African opposition was bypassed. The biggest mistake in this context was 
the inability of colonial authorities to fully appreciate that the anti-federation campaign was 
not simply political posturing by a handful of Western-based agitators.86 It was at once an 
expression of African assertiveness and a rejection of the racial status-quo. The failure to give 
a sympathetic hearing to Africans would not only cause widespread hostility towards the 
Federation, but it also marked the point of departure from which Africans could safely assume 
that Britain acted in African interests. The British government had, remarked Hastings Banda, 
showed itself to be ‘cold, calculating and callous’; it could not impose partnership by force.87 
As he later told Donal Brody in an interview, 
I could not believe that almost one hundred years of promises of eventual self-
determination were broken by a cabal of selfish individuals seeking to exploit the 
very Africans they had, almost a century ago, pledged to protect. I would not take 
this lying down…I was determined to be the thorn in the side of the British in London 
and in the side of the settler government in Salisbury.88 
From this juncture, both Congresses realised that their policies and their claim to represent 
African opinion in general needed to change if it was to exert any meaningful influence on 
British policy. Such hostility contributed to making British aims unworkable. When Federation 
was inaugurated, Africans realised that allegedly ‘legitimate’ appeals for greater representation 
merely resulted in their further entrenchment under settler rule. During these crucial years, 
Africans laid the foundations for a movement that was later to win independence from Britain. 
Africans had gained valuable organisational experience and had committed themselves with a 
truly national cause, one that would affect all Africans. Rather than subdue African 
nationalism, therefore, Africans in the North thus came to interpret Federation as an insuperable 
barrier to their own ambitions for national self-determination and its imposition gave African 
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